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THE HEALTH AND SAFETY AT WORK 
ACT 2015: THE MYTH OF INCREASED 
DETERRENCE  
Nadia Dabee* 
An assumption frequently made about the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 is that the imposition 
of more responsibility on businesses and officers and higher criminal penalties will increase the 
deterrence of workplace accidents. This article argues that the anticipated increase in deterrence is 
a myth. In the new Act the definitions of duty-holders and their duties are broad and flexible. In 
theory, in the face of this broadness and flexibility, businesses who are risk-averse will over-comply 
with safety regulations to ensure they do not face a penalty. The new law appears to increase 
penalties and impose higher obligations on a greater number of duty-holders. However, in reality, 
the standard of care on employers remains unchanged, as do the enforcement mechanisms. Thus, in 
practice, the incentives to under-comply are higher than the incentives to over-comply and 
deterrence is unlikely to increase.  
I INTRODUCTION  
This article argues that the deterrence of workplace accidents will not increase significantly 
under the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 (HASWA), compared with deterrence under the 
Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 (HASEA).  
This article first gives a brief explanation of the deterrence theory, and explains that the 
rationale for imposing criminal liability on duty-holders is to deter workplace accidents. The article 
then seeks to clarify the understanding of the definitions of duty-holders under the HASWA by 
making reference to Australian jurisprudence.1  
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1  Australian case law is an appropriate reference point to understand the New Zealand legislation as the 
Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 [HASWA] is based on the Workplace Health and Safety Act 2011 
(Cth).  
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Next, based on a review of the equivalent Australian legislation and court precedents, the article 
shows that, in some situations, duties are not precisely defined in the HASWA. Uncertainty in legal 
standards may cause some risk-averse businesses to over-comply with safety regulation, which 
should increase deterrence.2 
However, there are three main reasons why deterrence will not increase under the HASWA. 
First, the HASWA does not impose, in practice, higher legal standards of care than the HASEA. 
There is thus no added incentive for businesses to increase their compliance efforts. Secondly, it is 
unlikely that the costs of punishment for non-compliance will ever exceed the cost of compliance. 
An examination of the sentencing of offenders by the courts bears this out. Thirdly, and most 
importantly, the regulator – WorkSafe – does not have enough resources to effectively identify, 
investigate and prosecute significantly high numbers of potential breaches.3 The risk of a breach 
being discovered will be discounted by duty-holders thus reducing the incentives to comply.4  
Deterrence may increase slightly in industries with a high risk of death or serious injury as 
WorkSafe is focussing enforcement efforts on these industries, and a fine following a serious 
accident is likely to be severe. But deterrence will probably not increase significantly overall, across 
all industries. 
The HASWA gives Health and Safety (H&S) representatives significant enforcement powers, 
which would,5 at first glance, increase deterrence. However, having a H&S representative is only 
compulsory in workplaces with 20 or more workers and if the person conducting a business or 
undertaking (PCBU)6 is in a "high-risk sector or industry".7 Smaller businesses, which tend to have 
  
2  See John E Calfee and Richard Craswell "Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal 
Standards" (1984) 70 Va L Rev 965.  
3  Kevin Purse and Jillian Dorrian "Deterrence and Enforcement of Occupational Health and Safety Law" 
(2011) 27 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 23. Enforcement has 
been identified as the most important factor for deterrence. 
4  Duty-holders are persons who have obligations under the HASWA. PCBUs, officers and employees are the 
main duty-holders in the new Act.  
5  HASWA, above n 1, s 16. An H&S representative is a worker who has been elected by other workers to 
represent the interests of the workers. 
6  Section 17. A PCBU "means a person conducting a business or undertaking whether alone or with others" 
and "whether or not … conducted for profit or gain".  
7  HASWA, above n 1, s 62.  
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worse safety outcomes, will not benefit from having H&S representatives who can use their ability 
to enforce the legislation as a deterrent measure.8  
The liability of officers under the HASWA is discussed in a separate section.9 Whereas directors 
were liable as accessories to the company under the HASEA, the HASWA now imposes separate 
"due diligence" duties on directors personally. Duties are also imposed on officers of all types of 
organisations.  
Even though there are now more duty-holders who fall within the definition of officers, and the 
duty requires officers to take positive steps to ensure their organisation complies with safety 
regulation, deterrence is also unlikely to increase significantly for officers. The risk of punishment 
remains small because of the low probability of breaches being detected and the low probability of a 
successful prosecution.  
The article concludes by arguing that deterrence can only be increased by adopting draconian 
measures which are not feasible in practice. A further legislative initiative may be required to 
decrease the rate of workplace accidents in New Zealand.  
II THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
A The Deterrence Theory 
There is an underlying assumption that deterrence should be at the core of occupational health 
and safety (OHS) legislation.10 The deterrence theory states that, if the costs of breaching a rule are 
higher than the costs of complying with the rule, then the duty-holder, seeking to minimise their 
costs, will comply with the rule.11 The deterrence theory presupposes that duty-holders are "rational 
utility maximisers": duty-holders will act rationally to maximise their gains or minimise their 
  
8  See for example David E Cantor and others "Technology, Firm Size, and Safety: Theory and Empirical 
Evidence from the US Motor-carrier Industry" (2016) 55 Transportation Journal 149. There is a positive 
correlation between firm size and safety outcomes. 
9  HASWA, above n 1, s 18. An officer of a PCBU is defined as inter alia "any person occupying the position 
of a director of the company by whatever name called", a partner in a partnership, a general partner in a 
limited partnership, a person occupying a position similar to that of a director, or a person that has 
"significant influence over the management" of the PCBU. 
10  Cantor, above n 8.  
11  David M Kennedy Deterrence and Crime Prevention: Reconsidering the Prospect of Sanction  (Routledge, 
New York, 2009) at 1. See also Steve Tombs and David Whyte "The Myths and Realities of Deterrence in 
Workplace Safety Regulation" (2013) 53 Brit J Criminol 746 at 750. See generally Cesare Beccaria Of 
Crimes and Punishments (Oxford University Press, London, 1964); and JH Burns and HLA Hart Bentham: 
an Introduction to the Principals of Morals and Legislation (Methuen, London, 1982) at 74. 
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losses.12 For the deterrence theory to work as predicted, duty-holders must be able behave rationally 
at all times and must have access to the right information. 
However duty-holders may not be able behave rationally in practice.13 They may not have all 
the available information, or may be unable to fully understand the information they do have due to 
cognitive limitations – a phenomenon known as "bounded rationality".14 For example, a company 
director may not be able to fully understand, or even be aware of, their responsibilities under the 
HASWA and may assume they are complying, when they are not. 
Duty-holders may not be able to accurately predict the legal consequences of their actions if 
they break the law. If they wrongly estimate the type of punishment they will receive, or  the risk of 
being caught for a breach, they cannot accurately estimate the costs and benefits of breaking a 
rule.15 As this article will show, the risk of being caught for a breach, and the risk of receiving a 
severe punishment are low, except for very serious breaches. In general, duty-holders will tend to 
exaggerate the likelihood of not being caught, and under-comply.16 
B The Deterrence of Companies 
Companies are the biggest employers in New Zealand.17 As employers, companies have a duty 
of care under the HASWA, so considering the deterrence of companies is important. The HASWA 
changes some of the mechanisms for corporate deterrence. 
The identification doctrine will still apply to make the company liable.18 For example, when a 
floor manager does not do all that is reasonably practicable to ensure the safety of the workers on a 
  
12  Kennedy, above n 11, at 16–17.  
13  See generally Christine Jolls, Cass R Sunstein and Richard Thaler "A Behavioural Approach to Law and 
Economics"(1998) 50 Stan L Rev 1471; and Richard A Posner "Rational Choice, Behavioural Economics, 
and the Law" (1998) 50 Stan L Rev 1551. Jolls, Sunstein, Thaler and Posner also talk about "bounded 
willpower" and "bounded self-interest". See also Paul H Robinson and John M Darley "The Role of 
Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At its Worst when Doing its Best" (2003) 91 Ga L 
Rev 949 at 949 and 954. 
14  Jolls, Sustein and Thaler, above n 13, at 1476; and Posner, above n 13, at 1555. 
15  Kennedy, above n 11, at 16–17.  
16  Paul Gordon and Alan Woodfield "Ex Ante Liability Rules in New Zealand's Health and Safety in 
Employment Act: A Law and Economics Analysis" (2007) 41 New Zealand Economic Papers 91. 
17  As a rough indicator, 91 per cent of newly registered businesses in 2014–2015 were limited liability 
companies. "Statistics" (11 May 2016) New Zealand Companies Office <www.business.govt.nz >.  
18  See generally Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission [1995] 3 NZLR 7 
(PC) at 16 per Lord Hoffman.  
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factory floor, the manager is acting as the company.19 It is the company who gets punished for 
failing to do all that is reasonably practicable to ensure the safety of the workers. Punishing the 
company should then, in theory, get the individuals within the company to react to the threat of a 
fine and ensure that the company meets its regulatory obligations. 20  Brent Fisse and John 
Braithwaite argue that imposing liability on corporations does not always ensure that individuals 
within the company react by complying with regulation when there are no legal mechanisms to 
ensure steps are taken by the company to hold individuals within it accountable.21 A lack of legal 
rules to ensure that companies change the way they operate after an accident also means that the 
company can go on to commit the same breach, which means there is no deterrence.22 
The HASEA tried to mitigate the lack of accountability by making directors liable as accessories 
to the company's breach when they participated in, or knew about the breach.23 Only company 
directors who were actively involved in the day-to-day running of the company have been 
punished.24 The HASWA tries to overcome the problem of lack of accountability in a different way. 
The HASWA imposes personal liability on officers of businesses to exercise due diligence to ensure 
the organisation complies with its obligations.25 The officer has a positive duty to act, and will be 
punished for failing to exercise due diligence.  
This article will demonstrate that, even by making officers personally liable, deterrence is 
unlikely to increase significantly. The reason that deterrence will not increase is the uncertainty 
around enforcement of the new due diligence duties.  
  
19  HASWA, above n 1, s 36. See Bilta (UK) Ltd (in liq) v Nazir (No 2) [2015] UKSC 23, [2016] AC 1 at [208] 
per Lord Neuberger: "attribution of the conduct of an agent so as to create liability on the part of the 
company depends very much on the context".  
20  Brent Fisse and John Braithwaite Corporations, Crime and Accountability (Cambridge University Press, 
United Kingdom, 1993) at 1.  
21  At 1.  
22  At 1.  
23  Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 [HASEA], s 56.  
24  See for example R v Burr [2015] NZHC 2207. 
25  The rationale for imposing due diligence duties on officers is also to improve workplace safety culture. See 
Robin Stewart-Crompton, Stephanie Mayman and Barry Sherrif National Review into Model Occupational 
Health and Safety Law: First Report (Australian Government, October 2008) [First Report] at [8.1]–[8.5]. 
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III THE RATIONALE FOR IMPOSING CRIMINAL LIABILITY ON 
DUTY-HOLDERS 
Criminalising an act discourages most people from committing that act.26 For example, if it is a 
criminal offence to endanger workers' lives, all things being equal, an employer is more likely to 
take care not to endanger workers' lives than if the employer's liability was only civil. Thus, criminal 
liability was favoured over civil liability by the Australian National Review into health and safety 
legislation.27 Despite the procedural hurdles in securing criminal convictions, criminal liability was 
preferred as the threat of criminal sanctions was seen as increasing deterrence.28  
The assumption that criminalising an act can increase deterrence does not always hold true, 
especially when businesses tend to see paying fines as an operational cost, rather than a criminal 
penalty.29 
IV DUTY-HOLDERS UNDER THE HASWA AND THEIR 
CORRESPONDING DUTIES 
A PCBUs and the Changing Nature of Work 
The HASWA introduces the concept of a "person conducting a business or undertaking" 
(PCBU). The term "PCBU" replaces the term "employer" in the HASEA. An employer was 
someone who "employs any other person to do any work for hire or reward".30 The term was too 
restricted in scope as it did not cover all possible workplace arrangements.31  
The modern workplace is evolving.32 New technologies connecting workers to the workplace 
and businesses remaining open 24/7 require a flexible labour force. Workers can now be permanent, 
temporary or shift workers, on hire from employment agencies, volunteers or interns. Immigration, 
ageing populations and the fact that more women are engaged in the workforce are also changing 
the traditional model of labour under which one could expect a steady, life-long, nine-to-five job.  
  
26  Robinson and Darley, above n 13, at 957.  
27  First Report, above n 25, at [10.14]–[10.15].  
28  First Report, above n 25, at Recommendation 50. 
29  Ron McCallum, Toni Schofield and Belinda Reeve "The Role of the Judiciary in Occupational Health and 
Safety Prosecution: Institutional Processes and the Production of Deterrence" (2012) 54 Journal of 
Industrial Relations 688 at 698. 
30  HASEA, above n 23, s 2. 
31  First Report, above n 25, at [6.53]. 
32  See generally Ali Dastmalchian and Paul Blyton "Workplace Flexibility and the Changing Nature of Work: 
An Introduction" (2001) 18 Canadian Journal of Administrative Science 1.  
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To cover the myriad of new work arrangements, the HASWA has a broad and flexible definition 
of a PCBU.33 Section 17 defines a PCBU as a person conducting a business or undertaking, alone or 
with others, and whether or not for profit or gain. But the terms "person", "conducting" and 
"business or undertaking" are not defined.  
Section 29 of the Interpretation Act 1999 defines the term "person" as including a "corporation 
sole, a body corporate, and an unincorporated body". Companies, partnerships and sole traders can 
be PCBUs.34 The term "conducting" implies a degree of control over the work being done,35 over 
the workers,36 and over the workplace.37 
A "business" is a trade activity, a profession or the "carrying out of work as a whole".38 In s 2 of 
the Commerce Act 1986 and in s 2 of the Fair Trading Act 1986, the term "business"  is defined as 
"any undertaking that is carried on for gain or reward" in the course of supplying goods and services 
or, "while acquiring or disposing of any interest in land".  
The term "undertaking" is more difficult to define. The Court of Appeal of England and Wales 
explained the term to mean an "enterprise or business". 39  In the Australian case Victorian 
WorkCover Authority v Horsham Rural City Council, Hansen J said:40  
The word must take its meaning from the context in which it is used. In my view it means the business 
or enterprise of the employer … The circumstances must be as infinite as they may be variable.  
Certain categories of persons are considered not to be conducting businesses or undertakings, 
that is, they are not PCBUs: workers, officers, volunteer associations, householders in most 
situations, statutory officers and any person expressly stated as not being a PCBU by law.41 
Volunteer associations refer to groups of volunteers working together for one or more 
community purposes, for example, church organisations, hospices and the Red Cross. Volunteer 
  
33  HASWA, above n 1, s 13. 
34  First Report, above n 25, at [6.51]. 
35  Robin Stewart-Crompton, Stephanie Mayman and Barry Sherrif National Review into Model Occupational 
Health and Safety Law: Second Report (Australian Government, January 2009) [Second Report] at [23.19]. 
36  At Recommendation 83. 
37  HASWA, above n 1, s 37. 
38  Second Report, above n 35, at [23.13]. 
39  R v Associated Octel Co Ltd [1994] 4 All ER 1051 (Crim App) at 1061.The term is clearly intended to cover 
organisations that are not-for-profit: HASWA, s 17(1)(a).  
40  Victorian WorkCover Authority v Horsham Rural City Council [2008] VSC 404 at [47]. 
41  HASWA, above n 1, s 17(1). 
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associations are not PCBUs so as to not discourage volunteering by imposing heavy burdens on 
volunteer organisations.42 However, if a volunteer organisation employs another volunteer or an 
employee to carry out work, then it is a PCBU,43 for example, a volunteer organisation that carries 
out funding-raising activities, like running a shop. School trustees who employ people would also 
have duties under the HASWA. 
Householders are generally not PCBUs but can become a PCBU in certain situations. For 
instance, a householder who has a party or a garage sale is not a PCBU. Householders who engage 
others for residential work, such as domestic chores, are also not PCBUs. If there is an employer-
employee relationship between the householder and a third party, for example the householder and a 
nanny, then the householder is a PCBU.  
A statutory officer performs duties in an official position established by legislation.44 Officers 
appointed to government departments, such as chief executives in the Ministry of Health, or 
appointed to local councils will not have a primary duty of care. But they may still owe a duty of 
"due diligence", for example, if they are an officer of the hospital.45 An elected member sitting on a 
regional council does not owe any duties of due diligence,46 unless they are also acting as an officer 
of the council.47  
B Confusion Reigns  
Submissions to the Transport and Industrial Relations Committee on the Health and Safety at 
Work Reform Bill show that the business community is in a state of confusion over the definition of 
a PCBU. For instance, the Business Leaders' Group has said that the term "PCBU" is "confusing and 
creates uncertainty".48 The Otago Southland Employers Association said the term was "the most 
confusing issue to come out of our recent consultation".49 
  
42  First Report, above n 25, at [6.10]. 
43  HASWA, above n 1, s 17(2). 
44  Crimes Act 1961, ss 73–98F. 
45  The Australian Review into the model OHS law recommended that directors and senior managers of the 
Crown be specifically included in the definition of "officer": Second Report, above n 35, at [23.147]. The 
HASWA does not specifically refer to directors and senior managers of the Crown, but the Act does not 
specifically exclude them either. See Part VI below for a definition of "officer". 
46  HASWA, above n 1, s 52(2).  
47  Health and Safety Reform Bill 2015 (192–2) (select committee report) at 8. 
48  Business Leaders' Health and Safety Forum "Submission to the Transport and Industrial Relations 
Committee Health and Safety Reform Bill" at 2. 
49  Otago Southland Employers Association "Submission to the Transport and Industrial Relations Committee 
Health and Safety Reform Bill: Strategic Review of the Workplace Health & Safety System" at [5].  
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The fear may be unwarranted. Most employers (and officers) will know whether they owe a 
duty under the HASWA. In reality, uncertainty will exist in only a few situations. For example, 
would a farmer who gets his 12-year old and 10-year old to help milk the cows be a PCBU? The 
uncertainty of definitions at the margins may mean that a few duty-holders might not know they are 
duty-holders and thus might fail to comply with the HASWA, meaning they cannot be deterred at 
all.  
C The Duties of PCBUs under the HASWA  
PCBU's owe a "primary duty of care" to workers and other persons. The term "primary duty of 
care" signifies the duty of care owed by those who can "direct or influence the way in which work is 
done"; that is, PCBUs. PCBUs owe a primary duty of care to ensure "as far as is reasonably 
practicable, the health and safety" of workers and of other persons who may be affected by the 
activities of the PCBU.50  
The term "primary" is used to demonstrate the primacy or importance of the duty.51 The primary 
duties of care in the HASWA "establish the overarching [occupational health and safety] 
responsibilities of key parties involved in the conduct of a business or undertaking".52 The use of the 
word "primary" also connotes that the PCBU is being made directly, not vicariously, liable for the 
actions of its agents. 
Under the HASEA, employers had to "take all practicable steps to ensure the safety of 
employees while at work". 53  An employee was simply someone who was "employed by an 
employer to do any work (other than residential work) for hire or reward under a contract of 
service".54 Under the HASWA, the PCBU must ensure the health and safety of workers "so far as is 
reasonably practicable".55 The term "worker" is defined in relation to a PCBU.56 The definition is 
  
50  HASWA, above n 1, s 36(1)–(2). 
51  Barry Sherriff and Michael Tooma Understanding the Model Work Health and Safety Act (CCH Australia, 
Australia, 2010) at 17. 
52  First Report, above n 25, at [6.1]. 
53  HASEA, above n 23, s 6. 
54  Section 2. 
55  HASWA, above n 1, s 36. 
56  Section 19. 
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broad and is meant to include volunteers, contractors, subcontractors and for-hire workers,57 an 
apprentice, a person gaining work experience and a person in a work trial.58  
D Qualification of the Primary Duty of Care 
The primary duty in the HASWA is subject to the "reasonably practicable" test. The PCBU must 
take into account and weigh the following factors to ensure health and safety:59 
(a)  the likelihood of the hazard or the risk concerned occurring; and 
(b)  the degree of harm that might result from the hazard or risk; and 
(c)  what the person concerned knows, or ought reasonably to know, about— 
(i)  the hazard or risk; and 
(ii)  ways of eliminating or minimising the risk; and 
(d)  the availability and suitability of ways to eliminate or minimise the risk; and 
(e)  after assessing the extent of the risk and the available ways of eliminating or minimising the risk, 
the cost associated with available ways of eliminating or minimising the risk, including whether 
the cost is grossly disproportionate to the risk. 
The "reasonably practicable" test seeks to limit the cost and effort of taking precautions in 
avoiding an accident and the resulting harm. While the HASWA says that the factors should be 
"weighed", the term "grossly disproportionate" suggests a test that requires more than just a simple 
cost-benefit analysis. For example, the PCBU has to take safety measures even if doing so could 
slow production, but not if it would make production impossible.   
E The Reasonably Practicable Test in the HASWA Contrasted with the 
All Practicable Steps Test in the HASEA  
Under the previous law, the duties of employers were subject to the "all practicable steps" test.60 
The employer would have had to consider the nature and severity of the harm, the current state of 
knowledge about the likelihood of the harm and the harm itself, and the means available to prevent 
the harm. An employer could also consider the cost and availability of the protective means when 
deciding what practicable steps to take. 
  
57  "For-hire workers" are workers sent to work for the PCBU by an employment agency. 
58  Second Report, above n 35, at [23.249]–[23.261]. The term "work trial" is not defined.  
59  HASWA, above n 1, s 22. 
60  HASEA, above n 23, s 2A. 
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Taking all practicable steps under the HASEA did not require the duty-holder to do all that was 
"physically possible".61 The New Zealand Court of Appeal in Attorney-General v Gilbert approved 
the "balancing" approach.62 The Court explained that the "obligation requires reasonable steps 
which are proportionate to known and avoidable risks".63 
Take the simple task of choosing the right protective personal equipment (PPE) for a particular 
task.64 The employer needs to foresee the risks associated with a task, for example, the possibility of 
burns from steam or from molten metal in a foundry.65 The employer must also know of the latest 
technology and materials available to protect against burns. When deciding which type of material 
to use, the employer needs to look at the benefits and disadvantages of each material, like the 
protection level against molten metal or steam. The employer also needs to consider the 
physiological effects on the wearer, for example, the weight and breathability of the material.66 The 
availability and cost of the protective gear is also relevant in deciding which safety measures to 
take.67 The decision on what safety measures to adopt will often involve a "compromise between 
competing interests".68  
The new duty under the HASWA says that the duty-holder must take the precaution unless the 
cost is grossly disproportionate to the risk. The purpose of the HASWA is to provide workers with 
"the highest level of protection against harm".69 This may suggest a higher standard of care than 
under the HASEA, which is what some of the submitters on the Bill believed.70  
Australian case law may shed some light on how the reasonably practicable test could be 
interpreted under the HASWA.71 Queensland, New South Wales, the Australian Capital Territory, 
  
61  Edwards v National Coal Board [1949] 1 KB 704 (CA) at 712 per Asquith LJ.  
62  Attorney-General v Gilbert [2002] 2 NZLR 342 (CA) at [83]. 
63  At [83]. 
64  See for example Buchanans Foundry Ltd v Department of Labour [1996] 3 NZLR 112 (HC).  
65  At 336. 
66  At 336.  
67  At 338–339.  
68  At 336–337.  
69  HASWA, above n 1, s 3. 
70  A submission to the Transport and Industrial Relations Committee on the Health and Safety in Employment 
Bill said that the HASWA would impose a higher standard of care than under the HASEA: Simpson 
Grierson "Submission to the Transport and Industrial Relations Committee Health and Safety Reform Bill" 
at 4.  
71  Dinko Tuna Farmers Pty Ltd v Markos [2007] SASC 166, (2007) 98 SASR 96 at [44]. 
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the Northern Territory, South Australia, Tasmania and the Commonwealth of Australia have 
adopted the Model Act for Workplace Health and Safety. The definition of reasonably practicable in 
these six states and in the Commonwealth legislation is similar to the definition of reasonably 
practicable in the HASWA.72  
The Fairwork Commission has applied and explained the reasonably practicable test.73 The 
Commission balanced the cost of repairing a column at the entrance of a building against the risk of 
serious harm or death if the column was hit by a delivery truck.74 The conclusion was that the cost 
of fixing the column was low compared to the high risk of a serious accident occurring.  
The Federal Court of Australia also carried out a balancing exercise and considered the 
practicability of preventing the harm (putting a guard over boat propellers) and the possible harm 
(serious injury to anyone swimming near the boat), and decided that the employer had not done all 
that was reasonably practicable to protect employees.75  
There are a couple of Australian cases that show that the courts there seem to have adopted a 
proportionality test, rather than a gross disproportionality test. The new test, as interpreted and 
applied by the Australian courts, does not differ dramatically from the old test.  
The New Zealand courts may decide to veer away from the Australian courts' interpretation. 
They may conclude that the term "grossly disproportionate", when balancing risks in relation to 
costs, means that a higher standard of care is required from PCBUs.  
F Codes of Practice 
A code of practice is an approved method of carrying out a particular job or task in a manner 
that has been proven to reduce the risk of accident.76 Codes of practice were also used under the 
HASEA. 77  WorkSafe, New Zealand's OHS regulator, is responsible for developing codes of 
  
72  Workplace Health and Safety Act 2011 (Qld), s 18; Workplace Health and Safety Act 2011 (NSW), s 18; 
Workplace Health and Safety (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT), s 18; Workplace Health and 
Safety Act 2012 (SA) s 18; Workplace Health and Safety Act 2012 (Tas) s 18; and Work Health and Safety 
Act 2011 (Cth), s 18 . 
73  The Australian Postal Corporation v Comcare [2014] FWC 3228. 
74  At [57]–[58]. 
75  Comcare v Commonwealth of Australia [2012] FCA 1419 at [64]–[66]. A young trainee suffered severe 
injuries after falling into the water near an unguarded propeller. Other trainees had suffered propeller 
injuries before him, but the previous injuries were not as severe. 
76  HASWA, above n 1, s 222; and WorkSafe New Zealand Act 2013, s 10(e). 
77  HASEA, above n 23, s 20B. 
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practice. 78  WorkSafe has an obligation to consult with employers, unions and "other persons 
affected" when developing codes.79 Once approved by the Minister, the code becomes an approved 
code of practice (ACOP). ACOPs are tailored to suit the particular industry they are used in and can 
be changed quickly, compared with primary legislation, in response to changes within an industry.  
Following an ACOP is a way for a PCBU to show they have discharged their duties under the 
HASWA; that is, to show they have done all that is reasonably practicable.80 It is not compulsory 
for a PCBU to follow an ACOP. A PCBU can also show they have taken all practicable steps by 
providing evidence that they have a system of work with safety standards that are equivalent or 
better than the safety standards in the ACOP.81  
Unfortunately, relying on a code of practice is not always straightforward. While ACOPs are 
available free of charge on the internet,82 and hard copies can be purchased for a reasonable 
charge,83 ACOPs do not exist for every workplace situation in New Zealand. The PCBU may then 
have to spend time and money obtaining a code of practice from a professional body. For example, 
there are no ACOPs on food packaging in New Zealand. A PCBU would have to purchase a code of 
practice from an international body such as the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO). 
Applying the ISO standard could be a way of doing all that is reasonably practicable to ensure 
safety.  
Even if codes of practice are readily available, there may be hurdles in implementing them. 
Codes that are not drafted carefully could be too broad to be usefully implemented.84 The code may 
not deal with the specifics of the business and may not be easily adaptable to a particular situation. 
They may be poorly written and not easily understood,85 or even be out of date. Also, a PCBU 
might lack the expertise to be able to implement it.86  
  
78  WorkSafe New Zealand Act 2013, s 10(e). 
79  HASWA, above n 1, s 222. 
80  Section 233(2) and 233(3)(b).  
81  Section 233(4). 
82  Section 231(1). 
83  Section 231(2). 
84  Elizabeth Bluff and Neil Gunningham A Review of Key Characteristics that Determine the Efficacy of OHS 
Instruments (Australian Safety and Compensation Council, July 2008) at [30]. 
85  At [342]. 
86  At [350] and [351]. 
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The new law does not propose solutions to resolve old uncertainties in implementing ACOPs 
and codes of practice. 
G The Primary Duty of Care to Other Persons 
Under the HASEA, employers had to "take all practicable steps to ensure that no action or 
inaction of any employee while at work harms any other person", such as a member of the public 
who enters a construction site.87 
Under the HASWA, PCBUs must ensure:88  
… so far as is reasonably practicable, that the health and safety of other persons is not put at risk from 
work carried out as part of the conduct of the business or undertaking. 
Other persons could include people such as visitors or clients using the facilities.89  
It is not just the actions or inaction of employees that the PCBU has to manage,90 but the whole 
of its undertaking should be safe to other persons. For example, an employee could cause harm by 
accidentally spilling a toxic substance. The PCBU will have to manage the toxic spill at the place of 
work itself so that the toxic substance does not harm workers and visitors. If, however, there is a risk 
of the spill spreading to the road or sewage systems, then the PCBU will also have to take steps so 
far as is reasonably practicable, to prevent this occurring.  
While the wording of the new law appears wider in scope, an employer would have had to do 
the same under the old law. 
H Other Duty-Holders and their Duties 
1 Workers 
Workers can still influence the safety of the workplace, but do not have as much influence as a 
PCBU.91 Also, PCBUs stand to gain more economically from their undertaking than employees. 
Therefore, workers have less onerous duties than PCBUs.92  
  
87  HASEA, above n 23, s 15. 
88  HASWA, above n 1, s 36(2). 
89  In Dean Allan Coggins v Sunmanor Pty Ltd Industrial Court of Queensland C/2009/60, 17 June 2010, a 
white-water kayaking business was held to have duties to its customers. 
90  Cardrona Ski Resort Ltd v Department of Labour HC Invercargill CRI-2009-425-16, 11 September 2009.  
91  The HASWA replaces the term "employee" with the term "worker". HASWA, above n 1, s 19 defines 
"worker" as including employees, contractors, subcontractors, employees of contractors or of 
subcontractors.  
92  Sherriff and Tooma, above n 51, at 52. 
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Under the HASEA, employees had to "take all practicable steps" to ensure their safety and those 
of "any other person".93 Employees had to follow instructions of the employer. Under the HASWA, 
a worker has to take "reasonable care" of his or her own health and safety and ensure that their acts 
or omissions do not affect the safety of other persons.94 Workers also need to "as far as they are 
reasonably able" comply with reasonable instructions given by the PCBU and reasonable workplace 
policies and procedures.95 The term "reasonable care" implies an objective standard,96 but not one 
as stringent as the duty to take "all practicable steps".   
Even if the duty of care on employees is less onerous under the new law, the application of the 
new duties is not expected to differ dramatically from the application the old duties. For instance, in 
Department of Labour v Adams, decided under the HASEA, Mr Adams, a crane operator and 
employee of Central Cranes Ltd, swivelled his crane so that his portal came into contact with 
overhead power lines. 97  Mr Brownlee, who was holding onto the portal with a cable, was 
electrocuted and killed when the portal hit the power lines. The defendant was convicted for not 
taking all practicable steps to prevent harm;98 it was standard procedure to look out for power cables 
before beginning work.  
The outcome of the Adams case will almost certainly be the same under the HASWA. The 
defendant did not take reasonable care to prevent injury to Mr Brownlee by looking out for power 
cables and the defendant also failed to follow the standard safety procedure of looking out for 
cables. 
2 Other persons 
Visitors and other persons passing through a worksite may, by their actions or inactions affect 
the safety of workers and other persons.99 There is now a new duty on other persons at a workplace 
to "take reasonable care of his or her own safety",100 and to ensure "that his or her acts or omissions 
do not adversely affect the health and safety of other persons".101 There is also a duty to comply 
with instructions from the PCBU as far as those instructions allow the PCBU to comply with the 
  
93  HASEA, above n 23, s 19. 
94  HASWA, above n 1, s 45(a)–(b). 
95  Section 45(c)–(d). 
96  Sherriff and Tooma, above n 51, at 52. 
97  Department of Labour v Adams DC Pukekohe CRN6057007360, 18 September 2003.    
98  He was prosecuted for a breach of s 50 of the HASEA. 
99  First Report, above n 25, at [9.22]–[9.23]. 
100  HASWA, above n 1, s 46(a). 
101  Section 46(b). 
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HASWA. 102Cases involving the prosecutions other persons are likely to be few as WorkSafe 
usually focuses prosecution efforts on employers and employees.103  
3 Principals 
Under s 18 of the HASEA, principals had to take all practicable steps to ensure that no 
contractor or subcontractors or their employees were harmed while doing work they were engaged 
to do.104 In Central Cranes Ltd v Department of Labour, decided under the HASEA, the Court held 
that the duty of the contractor towards its employees was "patently greater" than the duties of the 
principal as the former were the direct employers. The principal was not, however, exonerated from 
liability.105 Central Cranes, as the principal, still had to take all practicable steps to ensure the safety 
of the employees of Skytech, the subcontractor.106 The principal was held to have breached its 
duties to the employees of the subcontractors. Central Cranes could have taken more steps to ensure 
the safety of Skytech's employees, for example, by talking to Skytech to ensure that the employees 
were using the correct safety gear.  
The guidelines issued for principals under the HASEA by the Ministry of Business, Innovation 
and Employment (MBIE) made it clear that principals cannot feign ignorance of safety matters 
affecting the employees of the contractor or subcontractor.107 It is clear that negotiation about safety 
processes must have occurred between principals and contractors.108 
Two sections in the HASWA are relevant to understand the duties of principals. First, s 36(1)(b) 
states that a PCBU owes a primary duty of care to workers whose activities are "influenced or 
directed" by the PCBU. The work of the principal would influence employees of a contractor or 
subcontractor, so the principal has to do what is "reasonably practicable" to look after the safety of 
employees of contractors and of subcontractors. What is reasonably practicable for a PCBU depends 
  
102  Section 41(c). 
103  No prosecutions against other persons have been made thus far. The regulator also targets its education 
efforts towards employers and workers: see for example "Information and Guidance" (2016) WorkSafe New 
Zealand <www.worksafe.govt.nz>. 
104  HASEA, above n 23, s 18. 
105  Central Cranes Ltd v Department of Labour [1997] 3 NZLR 694 (CA) at 702.  
106  At 702. The judgment states that if "there is a step which it would be practicable for [Central Cranes] to take 
… that step is required to be taken irrespective of what steps might be required of the employer".  
107  Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment A Principal's Guide to Contracting to Meet the Health 
and Safety in Employment Act 1992 (May 2010) at 7–10. 
108  At 20–51. 
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on their ability to take steps to implement safety measures.109 A principal will be less able to direct 
the employees of the contractor than the contractor would.  
Secondly, s 34 places duties on PCBUs with the same duty of care to consult, cooperate with 
and coordinate their activities with each other. For example, the principal, contractors and 
subcontractors all owe primary duties to workers on the same site,110  and now have a legal 
requirement to consult, cooperate and coordinate their activities. The potential fine is up to $20,000 
for an individual and $100,000 for any other person who fails to comply.111  
Previously the requirements to consult, cooperate and coordinate were part of the MBIE 
guidelines for principals. The threat of a fine under the new law may nudge a few more principals to 
discuss safety with contractors and subcontractors.  
4 Effect of uncertain legal standards 
Paul Gordon and Alan Woodfield argue that the legal standard of care, in the HASEA, about 
taking all practicable steps is uncertain.112 As shown above, the new legal standards do not differ 
dramatically from the old ones. While uncertain legal standards may increase deterrence in risk-
averse businesses, uncertain legal standards in combination with low penalties mean that employers 
are likely to underestimate the level of care needed.113  
To offset the tendency of employers to under-comply, Gordon and Woodfield argue that higher 
rates of inspection and higher penalties would be needed.114 Thus, they argue that legislation should 
allow for higher fines and the cost of the fine should also be greater than the cost of investing in 
measures that comply with the HASEA.115 But, as explained below, significantly higher fines and 
higher inspection rates remain unlikely under the new regime. 
I New Offences and Increased Penalties 
Under s 49 of the HASEA, it was an offence for "a person" to knowingly take any action or fail 
to take an action, where the action was "reasonably likely to cause serious harm to any person".116 
  
109  First Report, above n 25, at [6.84]. 
110  This will affect PCBUs who have duties under ss 37–43 as well. 
111  HASWA, above n 1, s 34(2). 
112  Gordon and Woodfield, above n 16. 
113  At 102. 
114  At 106. 
115  At 94–96. Such an increase in the fine amount would then require the court to hear expert evidence on the 
cost of the complying safety measures.  
116  HASEA, above n 23, s 49(1)–(2). 
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The action or inaction had to be "contrary to the provision [of the HASEA]", for example, failing to 
take all practicable steps to ensure the safety of employees under s 6. Fines of up to $500,000 and/or 
two years' imprisonment were possible for a breach of s 49.  
Section 50 created a further offence for failing to meet the requirements of the HASEA. For 
example, it was an offence for an employer to fail to take all practicable steps to ensure the safety of 
employees under s 6 It would have also been an offence to fail to give the appropriate training and 
supervision to an employee as required by s 13. A fine of up to $250,000 was possible for a breach 
of s 50 of the HASEA.117  
The penalties under the HASWA are significantly higher than under the HASEA. The 
Independent Taskforce on Workplace Safety (the Taskforce) was clearly in favour of increasing 
fines to improve deterrence.118 They recommended an increase in fines that would be in line with 
the fines imposed in Australia.119 The Australian National Review on workplace safety said that 
high maximum fines would have the "salutary effect in raising commitment to good OHS", even 
though the application of the maximum penalties would be rare in practice.120  
There are three offences under the new legislation, with significantly higher penalties. Firstly, 
there is the offence, under s 47, of a duty-holder who recklessly engages in conduct that exposes 
someone to a risk of death or serious injury or serious illness. The conduct must still also be 
contrary to the Act. The Australian National Review into the OHS Model Act said this offence 
would apply to "the most serious breaches, where there was a high level of risk of serious harm and 
the duty holder was reckless or grossly negligent".121 Recklessness refers to the state of mind of the 
duty-holder and considers whether a reasonable person, in the shoes of the duty-holder, would have 
foreseen the risk of harm and gone on to take the risk.122 Apart from the level of punishment, this 
new section is similar to s 49 of the HASEA. 
For an individual who is convicted of an offence under s 47 and who is not a PCBU or an officer 
of a PCBU, for example an employee, a fine of up to $300,000 and/or a term of imprisonment not 
exceeding five years may be imposed.123 For an individual who is a PCBU or an officer of a PCBU, 
  
117  Sections 49 and 50. 
118  Rob Jager and others The Report of the Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety: He 
Korowai Whakaruruhau (Ministry of Labour, April 2013) [Taskforce Report] at [326]–[328] and [391]. 
119  At [385]. See also Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Cth), ss 31–33. 
120  First Report, above n 25, at [12.22]. 
121  First Report, above n 25, at Recommendation 55. 
122  See generally R v Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396 (CA). 
123  HASWA, above n 1, s 47(3)(a). 
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a fine of up to $600,000 and/or up to five years' imprisonment is possible.124 For any other person, 
for example a company who is a PCBU, a fine of up to $3 million may be imposed.125  
Secondly, there are two strict liability offences under the HASWA. Section 48 makes it an 
offence to fail to comply with a duty in the HASWA thereby exposing an individual to a risk of 
death or serious injury. Section 48 would apply when there is a "high level of risk of serious harm 
but without recklessness or gross negligence".126 This offence did not exist under the HASEA. This 
specific offence did not exist under the HASEA. Under that Act, a breach of a duty that was not 
reckless but risked death or serious harm or illness could be punished by a fine of up to $250,000.127 
Under the new offence in the HASWA, the courts may impose higher fines for such breaches. For a 
breach of s 48, fines of up to $150,000 are possible for individuals who are not PCBUs or officers of 
PCBUs.128 Individuals who are PCBUs or officers of PCBUs may be fined up to $300,000.129 Other 
persons who are PCBUs may be fined of up to $1.5 million.130  
Section 49 makes it an offence to fail to comply with a duty in the HASWA. Section 49 applies 
when there are breaches of a duty without any of the aggravating factors in ss 47 and 48.131 Section 
49 thus applies when there is a breach of duty that carries no "risk of death or serious injury or 
serious illness". This offence is similar to the offence under s 50 of the HASEA, apart from the level 
of the fines. For a breach of s 49, individuals who are not PCBU or who are not officers of PCBUs 
may be subject to a fine of up to $50,000.132 An individual who is PCBU or an officer of a PCBU 
may be subject to a fine of up to $500,000.133 And for other persons who are PCBUs, a fine of up to 
$500,000 is possible.134  
The next section will consider whether the new offences and the increased penalties will lead to 
increased deterrence when they are enforced in practice. 
  
124  Section 47. 
125  Section 47(2)(c). 
126  First Report, above n 25, at Recommendation 55. 
127  HASEA, above n 23, s 50. 
128  HASWA, above n 1, s 47(2)(b). 
129  Section 48(2)(a). 
130  Section 48(2)(c). 
131  First Report, above n 25, at Recommendation 55. 
132  HASWA, above n 1, s 49(2)(a). 
133  Section 49(2)(b). 
134  Section 49(2)(c). 
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V THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE HASWA 
A The Approach of the Courts 
Increasing the maximum penalties will have no effect on deterrence unless the courts are willing 
to impose higher fines and jail sentences. There are some reasons to doubt substantially higher 
penalties will be imposed under the HAWSA.  
1 Tension with reparations 
Under the HASEA, courts had been awarding higher reparation amounts over high fines.135 
Reparation amounts are sums paid directly to the victim,136 and can be insured against. High 
reparation amounts can also be used to offset the amount of the fine the defendant has to pay.137 
Offsetting the fine amount usually happens when the defendant can only afford the reparation 
amount. 138  Increasing reparation amounts does not increase deterrence since the cost of the 
reparation is not usually borne directly by the defendant, but by the insurance company. The cost of 
the premium can then become a fixed running cost to the business.  
2 When pecuniosity is a factor: The de Spa decision and the Sentencing Act 2002 
Courts must use the guidelines in the Sentencing Act 2002 when determining the level of fine to 
impose. Aggravating circumstances such as the vulnerability of the victim and mitigating 
circumstances such as the remorse shown by the offender are taken into account.139 Offers to make 
amends to the victim can also be taken into consideration by the court to reduce the amount of the 
fine.140 PCBUs who are companies cannot show remorse. The pecuniosity of a PCBU-company is 
the main factor that a court is likely to take into account during sentencing. 
The decision of Department of Labour v de Spa and Co Ltd directs that fines must be 
commensurate with the employer's pecuniosity.141 The degree of culpability, the harm that occurred, 
  
135  See "Media Releases" WorkSafe New Zealand <www.worksafe.govt.nz>.  
136  Sentencing Act 2002, ss 11–14. 
137  Section 14.  
138  See Department of Labour v Hanham & Philp Contractors Ltd (2008) 6 NZELR 79 (HC) at [64]–[71]. 
139  Sentencing Act 2002, s 9.  
140  Section 10. 
141  Department of Labour v de Spa & Co Ltd [1994] 1 ERNZ 339 (HC) at 343–344. The court in Hanham also 
said that the starting point of the fine should depend on the defendant's level of "culpability", above n 138 at 
[54] and [61]–[62]. 
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whether or not a guilty plea was entered, compensation made to the victim and the employer's safety 
record are further factors in determining the level of the fine.142  
The most significant mitigating factor for fines is the financial means of the employer.143 The 
rationale for looking at the employer's financial means before imposing a fine is to keep the business 
afloat and preserve jobs.144 Higher fines will most probably be externalised (passed onto others) by 
the business. Goods may end up costing more, dividends on shares may drop, and, worst of all, 
employees may lose their jobs. The loss of jobs is what the courts may be trying to prevent by 
limiting fines. 
If an employer knows they will only ever receive a fine that they can afford to pay, there may 
never be sufficient deterrence. The cost of investing in safety measures will not exceed the cost of 
the fine. The Taskforce recommended that businesses that harm workers should have to pay stiffer 
fines, even if the consequence was the business shutting down.145 The Taskforce was of the view 
that a significant number of businesses failed anyway due to a poor business model. Under such a 
model they could not afford good health and safety measures and should be shut down.  
It seems unlikely, at this point in time, that courts will be willing to impose fines that will lead to 
businesses shutting down. Courts seem more willing to impose high reparation amounts. To avoid 
passing on costs of fines to the business, liability can pinned on individuals. Under the HASWA, 
officers of PCBUs can be fined higher amounts without making the business pay a fine it cannot 
afford. Officers, like businesses, cannot insure against the cost of a fine.146 However, as will be 
discussed in Part VI below, the problem of detecting breaches and securing convictions for an 
officer's breach of due diligence duties remains. 
B Certainty of the Enforcement 
A survey of empirical data on the deterrence of workplace accidents revealed that certainty of 
enforcement is the most important factor for deterrence.147 Gordon and Woodfield revealed that 
  
142  Department of Labour v de Spa & Co Ltd, above n 141, at 343–344. 
143  Alan Woodfield, Stephen Hickson and Andrea Menclova An Empirical Analysis of Changing Guidelines for 
Health and Safety in Employment Sentences in New Zealand (Working Paper No 14/2013 Department of 
Economics and Finance, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, 2013) at 3. 
144  Department of Labour v de Spa & Co Ltd, above n 141, at 343: "A fine at a particular level will obviously 
bear differently upon a small impecunious employer as opposed to a large financially strong employer." 
145  Taskforce Report, above n 118, at [389]. 
146  Companies Act 1993, s 162. 
147  Purse and Dorrian, above n 3. See also Calfee and Craswell, above n 2, at 981. 
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inspection rates were below the level required for effective deterrence.148 The Taskforce also found 
that enforcement of regulation was ineffective as there were not enough inspections and the chances 
of being caught for non-compliance were very low. 149  The Taskforce thus recommended an 
increase in capacity for enforcement and surveillance.150  
The Government has responded by providing an additional $33 million to increase the number 
of workplace inspectors. WorkSafe had 137 inspectors in 2013–2014, that is one inspector for every 
3,561 workplaces, with a plan to increase the number of inspectors to 200 by 2016.151 That still 
means only one inspector for every 2,500 workplaces. To visit every single workplace just once a 
year, each inspector would have to inspect 6.8 workplaces every single day of the year.  
It is difficult to say what the optimum rate of inspection should be. However, a study of food 
safety in restaurants suggests that the optimal rate of inspections should be three to four times a year 
for every business.152 Unfortunately, only 14,248 health and safety assessments were carried out by 
WorkSafe last year. In other words, out of a total of 487,875 businesses in New Zealand, only 2.9 
per cent were inspected.153 There are not enough inspections being carried out to detect and punish 
even the majority of violations, save for the most severe and obvious ones.  
A limited number of inspectors has meant that WorkSafe has had to prioritise the use of its 
inspectorate. One of the strategies WorkSafe adopted to maximise the use of its inspectors is to 
focus on high hazard industries.154 The Taskforce has suggested that activities which could lead to 
catastrophic disasters should be classified as high hazard industries and actively monitored. 155 
Focussing on a few businesses may increase specific deterrence in those industries. Unfortunately, 
overall, deterrence in most other sectors is unlikely to increase. 
  
148  Gordon and Woodfield, above n 12, at 91 and 92. 
149  Taskforce Report, above n 118, at [129]. 
150  At [148]. 
151  Worksafe New Zealand WorkSafe Annual Report 2013-2014 (2014) at 8.  
152  K Bruce Newbold and others "Restaurant Inspections Frequency and Food Safety Compliance" (2008) 71 J 
Environ Health 56 at 59.  
153  WorkSafe Annual Report 2013-2014, above at n 151, at 3. 
154  At 3.  
155  Taskforce Report, above n 118, at [311]. 
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1 The decision to prosecute 
WorkSafe's prosecution policy follows the Solicitor General's guidelines for prosecuting.156 The 
evidential test and the public interest test must both be passed before WorkSafe will start a 
prosecution. Under the evidential test, if the quality of the evidence does not foretell a reasonable 
chance of a successful prosecution, then WorkSafe will not prosecute.157 If the evidential test is 
passed, WorkSafe must decide whether the prosecution is in the public interest.158 Other factors to 
consider are whether a death occurred, the seriousness of the offence, disregard for safety, repeated 
breaches and obstruction of inspectors among others. In Australia, such an approach was found to be 
time-consuming and frustrating for inspectors, with more time spent deciding whether to prosecute 
and dealing with complaints rather than taking action to investigate an accident.159  
2 Worker participation and representation 
Worker engagement and participation is crucial for good workplace safety.160 The HASWA 
gives H&S representatives some significant powers which, in theory, should give more bargaining 
power to workers to negotiate better OHS conditions.  
H&S representatives have the power to issue improvement notices on a person they "believe … 
is contravening, or is likely to contravene" one of the duties in the HASWA.161 The notice must 
include details of the contravention and how the contravention may be remedied. An individual who 
breaches a provisional notice may be subject to a fine of up to $50,000.162 The fine is up to 
$250,000 for any other person.163 The fact that provisional notice must also be displayed in a 
"prominent place at or near the workplace" is an attempt to use a naming and shaming tactic to get 
PCBUs to comply.164 Failing to display the notice could result in a fine of up to $5,000 for an 
  
156  WorkSafe New Zealand Prosecution Policy (May 2016) at 9. 
157  At [7.1].  
158  At [7.2].  
159  Toni Schofield, Belinda Reeve and Ron McCallum "Australian Workplace Health and Safety Regulatory 
Approaches to Prosecution: Hegemonising Compliance" (2014) 56 Journal of Industrial Relations 709 at 
718 and 720. 
160  See generally Dov Zohar "Safety Climate in Industrial Organisations: Theoretical and Applied Implications" 
(1980) 65 Journal of Applied Psychology 96 at 97; and Beatriz Fernandez-Muniz, Jose Manuel Montes-
Peon and Camilo Jose Vazquez-Ordas "Safety Culture: Analysis of the Causal Relationships between its 
Key Dimensions" (2007) 38 Journal of Safety Research 627 at [2.2.3]. 
161  HASWA, above n 1, s 69. 
162  Section 78(4)(a). 
163  Section 78(4)(b). 
164  Section 76(1). 
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individual and up to $25,000 for other persons.165 The representative can also direct the cessation of 
unsafe work when they hold the reasonable belief that the work would expose a worker or other 
person to an OHS serious risk. The threat must be "immediate or imminent".166  
Under the HASWA, it is mandatory for PCBUs in high-risk sectors with 20 or more workers to 
have an H&S representative. High-risk sectors include the mining, petroleum extraction and 
exploration, forestry and hunting, building construction, and heavy and civil engineering 
construction industries.167  
However, less than one per cent of businesses in New Zealand which fall in the high-risk 
category have 20 or more employees.168 Moreover, large businesses in high-risk industries may 
already tend to have good OHS practices.169 Thus, the majority of businesses in New Zealand will 
not benefit from the increased deterrence that could come from H&S representatives having 
enforcement powers. 
VI OFFICERS  
A Duties of Directors under the HASEA  
When a company committed an offence under the HASEA, the "director, officer or agent" of the 
company could be made a party to the offence.170 To be liable, the director would have had to have 
"directed, authorised, assented to, acquiesced in, participated in, the failure of the company".171. 
Under s 49 of the HASEA, a company was criminally liable if the company had knowingly 
taken an action that was likely to cause serious harm to any person, or had knowingly failed to take 
an action where such an action would cause serious harm to any person. To be liable, the director 
would have had to have knowledge of, or participated in, the company's failings. 
  
165  Section 76(3). 
166  Section 84.  
167  For a full list of "high-hazard industries" see Health and Safety at Work (Worker Engagement, Participation, 
and Representation) Regulations 2016, r 5.  
168  "New Zealand Business Demography Statistics 2015" Statistics New Zealand <www.stats.govt.nz>. There 
are 502,170 businesses in New Zealand.  
169  See generally Ole Henning Sorensen, Peter Hasle and Elsa Bach "Working in Small Enterprises – Is there a 
Special Risk?" (2007) 45 Safety Science 1044. The authors' literature review reveals that larger organisation 
have significantly better safety systems than smaller organisations. 
170  HASEA, above n 23, s 56. 
171  Section 56. 
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For example, in R v Burr, Mr Burr, acting as an employee of Paul Burr Contracting Limited 
(Paul Burr Ltd), had knowingly failed to take all practicable steps to prevent serious injury to a co-
worker while operating a tree harvester.172 His actions were attributed to Paul Burr Ltd, and Paul 
Burr Ltd was liable as an employer under s 49. Mr Burr had participated in the company's failure by 
failing to ensure safety procedures were in place and negligently using the harvester. Because he 
was also a director, he was also liable under s 56.173 
Under s 50 of the HASEA, the company was only liable if it had failed to comply with its 
statutory obligations. The directors of the company were only liable for a failure of the company to 
comply with s 50 of the HASEA if they had knowledge of the failure or had participated in it.174  
An example is the case of McGall v Dominion Bookbinders Ltd.175 The company had failed to 
provide a safe workplace and an employee's child was injured. The child had been climbing a gate 
when the gate collapsed injuring the child. The company was liable for a breach of s 50 for failing to 
provide a safe workplace for any other person.176  The director was aware that the gate was 
defective, and had thus "participated" in the breach.177 The director was personally liable under s 
56.  
Under the HASWA, a director is no longer liable as an accessory to the company. The director 
now has a separate duty to exercise "due diligence" to ensure that the PCBU complies with its 
obligations under the HASWA.178 Moreover, the HASWA imposes liability not just on company 
directors,179 but on all "officers" of PCBUs. Unlike PCBUs, officers do not owe primary duties of 
care to workers and to other persons.180  
  
172  R v Burr, above n 24, at [21]–[26].  
173  At [30]–[31]. The director does not have to be discharging their duties as a director when they were 
involved in the company's breach of duty. 
174  HASEA, above n 23, s 56.  
175  McGall v Dominion Bookbinders Ltd DC Manukau CRI-2009-090-503893, 31 March 2010.  
176  At [8] and [59]. 
177  At [56] and [60]. 
178  HASWA, above n 1, s 44. 
179  Section 18(a)(i). 
180  Section 13(1)(b). 
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B The HASWA 2015 
1 Who is an officer? 
The HASWA defines the term "officer" as a person occupying the position of director "by 
whatever name called", 181  any partner in a partnership, 182  any general partner in a limited 
partnership183 or, for any other type of organisation, a person occupying a position comparable to 
that of a director.184 The term "officer" is not constrained by these definitions. The HASWA goes 
on to say that the officer can be any other person in a position to "exercise significant influence over 
the management of the PCBU".185  
It is not clear how far down the chain of command the due diligence duties extend.186 The 
definition of officer in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) has been adopted as the definition of officer 
under the Model Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Australia).187 Section 9 of the Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth) defines an officer as a director of a company, a partner in a partnership, an office holder 
of an unincorporated association, or "a person who makes, or participates in making, decisions that 
affect the whole, of a substantial part, of the business entity".  
Receivers, administrators and liquidators are also caught under the definition of officer, as de 
facto directors.188 The definition of officer may also cover health and safety advisors, middle level 
managers, and general counsel as long as they are involved in making decisions that affect the 
whole or part of the business.189 The Australian jurisprudence suggests that the net of liability is 
therefore wider than under the previous law. Given that the New Zealand HASWA is based on the 
Australian Model Law for Occupational Health and Safety, it is highly likely that New Zealand 
courts will adopt a similar stance to Australian courts.  
  
181  Section 18. 
182  Section 18(a)(ii). 
183  Section 18(a)(iii). 
184  Section 18(a)(iv). 
185  Section 13A(b). 
186  First Report, above n 25, at [8.37].  
187  Work Health and Safety Law 2011 (Cth), s 4; Second Report, above n 25, at Recommendation 88; and First 
Report, above n 25, at [8.33]. 
188  Sherriff and Tooma, above n 48, at 32. 
189  Simpson Grierson "Submission to Transport and Industrial Relations Committee, Health and Safety Reform 
Bill 2014" at 3. See also ASIC v Adler [2002] NSWSC 171, (2002) 41 ACSR 72 at [55]–[64].  
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2 Duties of officers  
The following is a summary of what an officer needs to do to discharge their due diligence 
duties.190  
 Officers need first-hand and up-to-date knowledge of the safety risks in their 
organisations to be able to interpret reports that are presented to them.  
 Officers must keep a close eye on highly hazardous activities even when they involve a 
low chance of causing serious damage.  
 Officers must ensure the business has adequate resources, including adequate staffing 
and infrastructure.191  
 Officers must also have systems where information on hazard management in the 
business flows through to them.192  
 Officers should also be the drivers of safety within the organisation. They are 
responsible for ensuring that the PCBU complies with its legal health and safety 
obligations. Safety systems should not be merely "on paper", but must actually work in 
practice.193 
The duty to exercise due diligence does not mean that the officer has to do everything possible, 
but only to take reasonable care.194 The duty to take reasonable care implies that the officer will be 
judged based on what a reasonable officer should do in relation to what they knew, or ought to have 
known about the situation.195  
The liability of the officer is independent of the liability of the PCBU. It is possible for an 
officer to be charged with a failure to meet their obligations to exercise due diligence, even if the 
PCBU itself has not been charged with an offence.196 
3 Criminal liability of officers  
If an officer recklessly engages, without reasonable excuse, in conduct that exposes an 
individual to whom the PCBU owes a duty, to a risk of death or serious injury, then the officer can 
  
190  HASWA, above n 1, s 44.  
191  Sherriff and Tooma, above n 51, at 35. 
192  At 39. 
193  At 41. 
194  Second Report, above n 35, at [23.167]. 
195  At [23.167]. 
196  HASWA, above n 1, s 50. 
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be made liable under s 47 of the HASWA.197 The penalties are a fine of up to $600,000, a prison 
sentence of up to five years or both. Breaching the duty of due diligence is not part of the offence. 
When an officer breaches their due diligence duties, for example, by not authorising the 
provision of enough resources to the PCBU to buy safety equipment, and as a consequence, an 
individual is exposed to a risk of death or serious injury, then the officer may be liable under s 48 of 
the HASWA and face a fine of up to $300,000. An officer who simply breaches their due diligence 
duties may be liable for a breach of s 49 and may face a fine of up to $100,000. 
If R v Burr and McGall v Dominion Bookbinders Ltd were decided under the HASWA,198 the 
results would most likely be very similar. The directors would probably have fallen foul of s 48 of 
the HASWA. They had breached their due diligence duties by failing to ensure the company had 
proper processes to comply with its primary duty of care towards its workers and towards other 
persons.199 In R v Burr, the director had failed to ensure that the safety procedures around tree 
felling were observed. In McGall, the director had failed to ensure that the PCBU maintained the 
entrance gate was properly. The breaches of duty caused a death and a serious injury respectively. 
The directors would have been in breach of s 44.  
In addition, Mr Burr would also most likely also be liable under s 47 for recklessly engaging in 
conduct that caused the death of a worker as the facts of R v Burr indicate that Mr Burr was reckless 
as to the risk of death or serious injury of his co-worker.200 
C Will Deterrence Increase? 
The nature of the duty has changed. Under the previous law, the company officer would only be 
liable if they knew of the company's failure or participated in it. Now, the officer must take 
reasonable care to ensure that the PCBU is complying.201 They must also be proactive and take 
reasonable steps to ascertain what the PCBU must do to comply and ensure that compliance does 
occur. They cannot avoid liability by saying they did not know of the PCBU's failure.202 It is also 
not possible to delegate the duty to exercise due diligence as the duty is imposed qua office.203 A 
  
197  Section 47(2). 
198 R v Burr, above n 24; and McGall v Dominion Bookbinders Ltd, above n 175. 
199  HASWA, above n 1, s 44(4)(e). 
200  R v Burr, above n 24, at [36]–[37]. 
201  Second Report, above n 35, at [23.167]. 
202  Inspector Ken Kumar v David Aylmer Ritchie [2006] NSWIR Comm 384 per Haylen J. 
203  Workcover Authority (NSW) v Akerman-Apache (Joint Venture) Pty Ltd [2006] NSWIR Comm 370. 
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director can rely on other people's expertise when doing so is reasonable,204 but would still have to 
assure themselves personally that the health and safety duties of the PCBU have been discharged 
correctly.205 
At first sight, it would appear that the imposition of a due diligence duty on more duty-holders 
will improve deterrence. However, there are three main reasons that deterrence will not increase 
significantly under the new law. 
First, officers may hedge their bets against being caught. A survey of directors in Australia was 
carried out shortly after the Australian Model Workplace Health and Safety law was 
implemented.206 A third of directors surveyed did not change their behaviour after implementation. 
The survey did not explain why some directors did not change their behaviour. One can only 
speculate. On the one hand, perhaps the perceived threat of being caught is low. As explained 
above, there are not enough resources to adequately monitor all businesses. On the other hand, it 
may be the directors surveyed did not know how to comply; 207  viewed compliance as an 
unnecessary burden; or thought compliance to be unachievable. Or perhaps the directors thought 
that what they were doing under the previous legal regime was sufficient to meet the requirements 
under the new regime. 
Secondly, convictions against officers will be harder to secure. The procedural hurdles may be 
even harder to clear under the new law. WorkSafe has to prove, beyond all reasonable doubt, that 
due diligence was not exercised.208 Under the previous law, the defendant had the burden of proving 
that they had taken all practicable steps on a balance of probabilities. 
Thirdly, the risk of a jail sentence remains virtually the same as it was under the old law. The 
threat of going to jail only applies when the officer breaches a duty and recklessly engages in 
conduct that is likely to cause death or serious injury. If an officer engages in such conduct, they 
could also be charged with manslaughter. The same situation existed under the old law.209  
  
204  See Companies Act 1993, s 138. 
205  Inspector Aldred v Herbert [2007] NSWIR Comm 170.  
206  Cormak E Dunn "Survey Examines Impact of New Safety Laws on Directors" (2013) 65 Keeping Good 
Companies 165. 
207  The WorkSafe website does not proved specific guidance to officers on how they can comply. Nor are there 
enough inspectors going around helping officers understand their duties. 
208  Karen Wheelwright "Understanding the Liability of Corporate Officers for Occupational Health and Safety 
Breaches in the Era of Harmonisation" (2012) 40 ABLR 410 at 422; and First Report, above n 25, at [8.24] 
and [8.31]. The prosecution will have the burden of proving that the officer did not exercise due diligence.  
209  In R v Burr, above n 24, the director was also charged with manslaughter. 
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A breach of due diligence duties, without recklessness, that results in a death or serious injury, 
may now result in a higher fine for the officer.210 A breach of due diligence duties, without a risk of 
death or serious injury, may also result in a fine.211 Paying a fine is not something that white-collar 
criminals fear.212 What white-collar workers fear is their reputation being irreparably damaged by a 
prison sentence. Paying a fine is not viewed as leading to a loss of peer esteem, but getting a prison 
sentence is seen almost as a death knell for one's career.213 
Thus, the deterrence for failing to comply with due diligence duties without recklessness, even 
when the breach results in death or serious injury, is minimal because paying a fine is not seen as a 
severe punishment by officers. Moreover, most officers of big organisations would be sophisticated 
enough to put their main assets into a trust, and thus shield themselves from the harshness of a big 
fine.  
VII THE REAL COST OF INCREASED DETERRENCE 
The design and implementation of the HASWA will not increase deterrence. Some suggestions 
to increase deterrence are presented here. 
First, to increase the probability of being caught and punished, WorkSafe could be given more 
money to spend on inspections and on taking legal action.214 More funding means either increased 
taxes, or cutting funding somewhere else.  
Secondly, by reducing the burden of proof, the number of successful prosecutions can be 
increased. WorkSafe's current strategy is to prosecute only when there is good evidence and it is in 
the public interest. Reducing the burden of proof is, however, untenable as it is a procedural 
safeguard which preserves the credibility of the legal system. Ultimately, citizens may stop 
believing in the law and stop following rules.215 
However, one way to lower the standard of proof without reducing the credibility of the legal 
system would be to introduce a system of civil pecuniary penalties.216 As OHS offences are not 
  
210  HASWA, above n 1, s 48.  
211  Section 49. 
212  William J Chamblis "Types of Deviance and the Effectiveness of Legal Sanctions" (1967) 3 Wis L Rev 703 
at 709. 
213  At 709–710. 
214  Robinson and Darley, above n 13, at 993. 
215  Neil Gunningham CEO and Supervisor Drivers: Review of Literature and Current Practice (National 
Occupational Health and Safety Commission, Australia, 1999) at 13. 
216  For a survey of the use of civil pecuniary penalties in Australia see Michael Gillooly and Nii Lante Wallace-
Bruce "Civil Penalties in Australian Legislation" (1994) 13 U Tas LR 269. 
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perceived as serious offences and only as operating costs,217 the aim of increasing deterrence is not 
served. Civil penalties can be used legitimately when liability is strict and does not require proof of 
recklessness. And the civil penalties imposed could be much larger than the current fines, to 
increase deterrence. Civil pecuniary penalties would give WorkSafe another enforcement tool it 
could use for breaches that are not severe enough to warrant a criminal prosecution, but that 
nevertheless need to be punished and deterred.218  
Thirdly, imposing harsher fines, even for small breaches could reduce accident rates overall. 
There is research that shows that a small breach of safety regulations leads to a tolerance of safety 
breaches within the organisation.219 Tolerance for small breaches builds up tolerance for bigger 
breaches by creating a poor safety culture. By not punishing small breaches harshly, the courts are 
not recognising the fact that small breaches usually lead to bigger breaches. But punishing small 
breaches severely may be seen as unjust. Moreover, the current rate of inspections would not allow 
for small breaches to be detected.  
A final possibility is targeting other regulatory offences committed by the PCBU or its officers. 
In a study on controlling drug trafficking, David Kennedy found that targeting associated crime, 
such as illegal gun possession and other minor offences committed by the gangs, had a dramatic 
effect on reducing drug trafficking.220 In the HASWA context, the safety investigation following an 
accident could be coupled with a scrutiny of the PCBU's financial records. The fear of close scrutiny 
into the business affairs of the PCBU may be enough to ensure that PCBUs and their officers make 
the utmost effort to comply with safety regulation. However, targeting PCBUs and officers for other 
offences may be seen as a strong approach, resulting in resentment. It would also require increased 
resources which may not be available. 
  
217  See MacCullum, Schofield and Reeve, above n 29.  
218  See generally Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation 
Debate (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992) at ch 2. The authors suggest that most of the enforcement 
activity of the regulator should be around education and persuasion. If the PCBU does not respond to 
education and persuasion, then the regulator escalates the enforcement measures to issue a warning. If the 
PCBU complies after the warning, the regulator can de-escalate their response and start using education and 
persuasion as tools to obtain compliance. However, if the PCBU still refuses to comply, then Ayres and 
Braithwaite suggest escalating the response to issuing civil pecuniary penalties, before escalating to criminal 
penalties. 
219  Joan M Eakin and Ellen MacEachen "Health and the social relations at work: A study of the health-related 
experiences of employees in small workplaces" (1998) 20 Sociology of Health & Illness 896. 
220  See Kennedy, above n 11, at 4–7. 
616 (2016) 47 VUWLR 
VIII CONCLUSION 
In spite of increased penalties, a greater range of duty-holders and more resources being put into 
enforcement, deterrence is unlikely to increase significantly under the HASWA  
While uncertainty in definitions may cause duty-holders to over-comply, the incentives to 
under-comply are weightier. The legal standards and requirements are mostly similar under the new 
law. Courts still have to consider the pecuniosity of the defendant when setting the fine amount. The 
amount of the fine will rarely exceed the amount the defendant would have had to spend to invest in 
complying safety measures. In spite of increased resources being put into enforcement, the 
likelihood of an inspection remains low.  
The scope of the new powers of H&S representatives have been diluted to the extent that any 
increase in deterrence from these new powers is likely to be minimal. Making officers of PCBUs 
personally liable is good step towards increasing deterrence. However, the threat of detection and 
the possibility of a successful prosecution still remain low.  
There is no doubt that criminal law does deter, but there is no evidence that deterrence will 
increase under the HASWA. Only a strong approach by WorkSafe, with the accompanying 
undesirable consequences, could increase deterrence significantly. 
 
